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Abstract: Th is article examines the 
critique of materialism in the work
of Noam Chomsky which treats
the doctrine as lacking in any clear 
content. It is argued that Chomsky’s
critique is a coherent one drawing on
an understanding of the Newtonian
revolution in science, on a modular 
conception of the mind, and on
the related conception of epistemic 
boundedness. Th e article also seeks to
demonstrate the limits of Chomsky’s
position by drawing attention to his
use of the third-person point of view 
in considering the mental and his re-
sulting failure to make good sense of 
consciousness. Finally, a dual-aspect 
theory is recommended which would 
incorporate Chomsky’s agnosticism
about the nature of matter.
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Zhodnocení kritiky materialismu 
u Noama Chomského
Abstrakt: Článek zkoumá a hodnotí 
kritiku materialismu v  díle Noama 
Chomského, podle níž je mate-
rialismus doktrínou bez jasného 
obsahu. Ukazuje se, že Chomského 
kritika je koherentní v tom, že uvádí 
do souladu interpretaci newtonovské 
revoluce v přírodní vědě s modulár-
ním pojetím mysli a související teorií 
kognitivní omezenosti. Dále se tento 
článek snaží poukázat na problema-
tický rys Chomského kritiky, spočíva-
jící v  tom, že uznává při zkoumání 
mysli pouze hledisko třetí osoby. Toto 
omezení vede k  podcenění úlohy 
a  významu vědomí. Závěrem autor 
navrhuje, že tento nedostatek by 
bylo možné opravit tím, že bychom 
Chomského agnostické stanovisko 
vůči hmotě propojili s  teorií dvou 
aspektů (dual -aspect theory).
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Noam Chomsky has expressed reservations about physicalism in many 
places in his writings and, when viewed together, these diff erent comments 
amount to a systematic critique. Unlike other philosophical themes in 
Chomsky’s work, such as his innatism, his modular theory of the mind or his 
arguments against behaviourism, the critique of materialism has received 
relatively little attention. One prominent critic of Chomsky is even able to 
nonchalantly pass him off  as a materialist.1
Th e principal aim of this paper is to show that Chomsky’s opposition to 
physicalism is backed up by historical and theoretical considerations which 
make it a powerful and coherent critique. Chomsky draws on fi ndings in 
diff erent fi elds, including linguistics, neuroscience, psychology and the his-
tory of early-modern science. In parts 1–5 I will explore the character of 
Chomsky’s position, and I shall show how two particular themes in his work 
combine to bolster his case against physicalism. One theme is an under-
standing of scientifi c progress and an interpretation of what Chomsky calls 
the “Newtonian revolution”; the other is a theory of human cognitive capaci-
ties and their biological grounding. In the fi nal two parts, 6 and 7, I shall 
point to what I take to be an important limitation of Chomsky’s critique of 
physicalism which relates to phenomenal consciousness, and I shall make 
a suggestion how this might be remedied.
1. What is physicalism?
Th e term “physicalism is of relatively recent origin, coined by Otto Neurath 
in the 1930s. Sometimes it has been preferred to “materialism” which has 
been associated with a metaphysical understanding of matter. We shall not 
be distinguishing between physicalism and materialism here. Aft er all, the 
distinction is oft en denied by those who are signed up to the doctrine – by 
David Lewis, for example – and it seems to play little role in Chomsky’s 
critique.2 Physicalism, for our purposes, is the claim that everything in the 
1 Daniel Dennett writes that Chomsky, as a scientist, is “presumably a materialist”. Daniel 
DENNETT, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. London: Penguin 1991, p. 387.
2  For a discussion of this terminological issue see Daniel STOLJAR, Physicalism. London – 
New York: Routledge 2010, Introduction.
Work on this study, which is a part of the project “Th e Concept of Consciousness: Its Unity 
and Variety”, has been fi nancially supported by the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR, 
P 401/12/0833), and has also been supported by Charles University (Program rozvoje vědních 
oblastí na Univerzitě Karlově č. P13 Racionalita ve vědách o člověku, podprogram Poznání 
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universe, including the mind itself, is constituted by the physical. Everything 
is either physical or in some way reducible to the physical. It is this claim that 
Chomsky fi nds to be problematic.
Now, Chomsky does not reject physicalism because he thinks it can 
be empirically refuted by pointing to some entity that is indisputably non-
physical. Nor does Chomsky fi nd the assertion of physicalism to involve any 
internal contradiction, or to otherwise be inconsistent. Chomsky’s objection
is that the doctrine has no clear content. He thinks that those who advocate 
physicalism and those who would endeavour to prove it false are both wrong 
in thinking that there is a substantive doctrine at issue. Chomsky holds this 
general view about physicalism because he also holds the more particular 
view that the concept of the “physical” (or the “material”), which must 
inevitably enter into any characterisation of physicalism, is devoid of clear 
meaning. At best, talk of “the physical” acts as a placeholder for whatever we 
discover, or could discover, to be true about nature. He writes:
Th ere is no longer any defi nite conception of body. Rather, the material world 
is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to 
have for the purposes of explanatory theory.3
Chomsky does allow that the terms “physical”, “material”, or “body” may 
serve as “honorifi c designations for what is more or less understood at some 
particular moment in time”.4 He writes: “Since the Newtonian revolution, 
we speak of the ‘physical’ world much as we speak of the ‘real’ truth: for em-
phasis, but adding nothing.”5 Chomsky also allows that the term may have 
motivational force, expressing and enjoining an endorsement of the meth-
ods of natural science. Some physicalists, notably Jeff rey Poland, fi nd this to 
be enough, and Poland is happy to sign up to a so-called “methodological 
physicalism”.6 But methodological physicalism is little more than an attitude 
or approach—it is not a  fact-stating claim about the world that is suscep-
tible of truth. For this reason most physicalists would fi nd it a thoroughly 
inadequate rendition of their doctrine, and they would agree with David 
Papineau when he writes: “Contemporary physicalism is an ontological 
3 Noam CHOMSKY, Language and the Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
1988, p. 144.
4 See Noam CHOMSKY, “Mysteries of Nature: How Deeply Hidden?” Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. 104, 2009, no. 413, p. 183 (167–200).
5 See ibid, p. 185.
6 See Jeff rey POLAND, “Chomsky’s Challenge to Physicalism.” In: ANTONY, L. M. – 
HORNSTEIN, N. (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell 2003, pp. 36–45 (29–48).
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doctrine rather than a methodological doctrine. It claims that everything is 
physically constituted, not that everything should be studied by the methods 
in physical science.”7
It is this ontological doctrine that we will be discussing. We should 
note, however, that Chomsky fully endorses the methods of natural science, 
and indeed it is this dedication to natural science that leads him doubt that 
there is any determinate meaning to the physical. He has consistently voiced 
a preference for the term “methodological naturalism” to express attach-
ment to scientifi c method. Th is, he argues, avoids confusion with the kind 
of physicalism that Papineau is referring to. So Chomsky is a thoroughgoing 
naturalist—he accepts a foundational role for the methods of science in in-
vestigating the world and establishing our ontology—but he is no physicalist.
2. Chomsky and the “Newtonian Revolution”
Many people would object at this point that the materialism can be given 
a more or less clear defi nition if we treat it as that the subject-matter of the 
core sciences, particularly physics itself, but also chemistry and perhaps parts 
of molecular biology. Th ey would look upon this part of science as providing 
us with a base to which other parts of science and knowledge can, in princi-
ple at least, be reduced. But Chomsky resists this attempt to give determinate 
content to the term because he holds a historical thesis about the progress of 
science. Th is thesis, perhaps most fully explored in his article “Th e Mysteries 
of Nature: How Deeply Hidden?” (2009), distinguishes Chomsky’s critique 
of physicalism from that of others, such as Carl Hempel, Bas van Fraassen, 
Tim Crane and Hugh Mellor, who have also claimed that the term “physical-
ism” lacks clear meaning. Chomsky is not primarily moved in his rejection 
of physicalism by the exotic content of quantum mechanics. He holds that 
the developments in science of the last hundred years merely confi rm what 
should have been apparent long ago. Physicalism, in Chomsky’s view, was 
already vacuous in the wake of the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687.
Chomsky holds that Newton, by attributing to bodies a universal power 
of attraction, abandoned an ideal of intelligibility that science had hitherto 
imposed upon itself. Th is ideal had been enshrined in the mechanical phi-
losophy with its intuitive conception of matter as extended, mobile stuff , 
cohering in bodies of diff erent shapes and sizes. Th e mechanists claimed 
7  David PAPINEAU, “Th e Rise of Physicalism.” In: Carl GILLETT – Barry LOEWER (eds.), 
Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, p. 3 (3–36).
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that body could only act by perspicuous contact-action such as pushing, re-
sisting, defl ecting, or dividing. Body could not act by attraction or repulsion 
because such forces would not fl ow transparently from the intuitive nature 
of body. For the same reason bodies could not act at a distance, but must act 
only where they are: that is, by mechanical impulse.
Newton, in Chomsky’s view, introduced a  diff erent approach to the 
methodology of science. Th e aim now was not to follow the dictates of a pre-
determined conception of what the physical is, but rather to posit attributes 
and powers with a view to achieving adequate explanation of the manifest 
principles operating in nature. Science was no longer concerned to reduce 
phenomena to some prior understanding of the physical, but rather:
To construct intelligible explanatory theories, taking as “real” what we are 
led to posit in this quest, and hoping for eventual unifi cation with the “core” 
natural sciences: unifi cation, not necessarily reduction.8
On Chomsky’s reading, the progress of science associated with Newton’s 
theory of gravitation was made possible by a deliberate suspension of judge-
ment about the real nature of “matter” and its action. Chomsky expresses 
this point in the terminology of Hume, by saying that the Newtonian revolu-
tion is one of “mitigated scepticism”.9 Newton wished to push on with dis-
covering and describing the manifest laws in nature, unrestricted by some 
preconception about the essential nature of the stuff  under investigation. 
Indeed, Chomsky is fond of quoting Hume’s verdict on Newton:
While Newton seemed to draw off  the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, 
he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; 
and thereby restored [nature’s] ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they 
ever did and ever will remain.10
Newton’s scepticism was shown by his reluctance to elucidate the modus 
operandi of gravitation, or explain how the force acts – a defi ant stance that 
is conventionally associated with the slogan “hypotheses non fi ngo”. But, to
scientifi c enquiry, this scepticism is not obstructive, but rather liberating. It 
8 Noam CHOMSKY, “Language and Nature.” Mind, vol. 104, 1995, no. 413, p. 2 (1–61).
9 Th e term was, of course, made famous by Hume. See David HUME, Enquiries Concerning 
Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Cambridge University Press 
1975, section XII, pp. 161–165. 
10  David HUME, History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to Th e Revolution in
1688. Vol. 6. Charlottesville: InteLex 2000, p. 542.
Noam Chomsky’s Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal
442
allows scientists to draw up laws that can express the manifest phenomena 
without having to conform to a conception of body predetermined by folk 
intuition.
Th e underlying concept of matter and motion – based on conceivability, intelli-
gibility, and common-sense understanding – had to be abandoned, and science 
had to proceed on an entirely new course in investigating the simplest phenom-
ena of motion, and all other aspects of the world, including mental life ... Th e 
legitimacy of the steps is [now] determined by criteria of depth of explanation 
and empirical support, not conceivability and intelligibility of the world that is 
depicted.11
Newton’s new approach to physics, Chomsky notes, was disturbing and 
paradoxical to scientists at the time and for a  long time aft er. He reminds 
us that Newton himself was never comfortable with the counter-intuitive 
implications of his physics, and at times was even moved to denounce 
attraction-at-a-distance as an “absurdity”.12 Chomsky also points out that
the hope lingered for almost two centuries aft er Newton’s Principia, that
a  mechanistic, or quasi-mechanistic, grounding would be given to the 
principle of gravitation and to other forces, and that something close to the 
intuitive conception of the physical might be reinstated.13 But, despite these
qualifi cations, Chomsky remains convinced that Newton’s achievement in 
drawing up robust, mathematical laws of motion – unconstrained by any 
narrow conception of the physical – has immensely positive consequences 
as an exemplar of scientifi c advance.
3. Th e modular theory of the mind
Now the particular strength of Chomsky’s position is that he sees a  con-
nection between the mitigated scepticism of Newtonian physics and a natu-
ralistic view of the mind that is part of the scientifi c view. Chomsky argues 
that we need to abandon a  conception of mind which he associates with 
Descartes, who wrote in his Discourse that our rational nature is a “universal
11 CHOMSKY, “Mysteries of Nature,” pp. 172 and 177 (167–200).
12  See ibid, p. 171 where Chomsky quotes the famous letter to Richard Bentley of 1693 in which 
Newton writes that action at a distance is “so great an Absurdity, that I believe no Man who 
has in philosophical matters a competent Faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.”
13  Noam CHOMSKY, Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988,
p. 144.
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instrument which can serve for all contingencies”.14 On this view – which 
is as much characteristic of the previous Aristotelio-Scholastic tradition of 
the “rational soul” as it is of Descartes15 – there are, in principle, no limits 
to what the mind can understand in nature because it is not a  structural 
part of the organism, but is rather a faculty of the non-material soul. Rejec-
tion of this “universal instrument” view of the mind is a key point on which 
Chomsky, the author of Cartesian Linguistics, diverges from strict Cartesian 
rationalism.
Th e reader may, at this point, think that Chomsky is fi ghting a battle that 
has already been long won. Who today, one might ask, would agree with the 
“universal instrument” conception of reason, with its anti-naturalistic ontol-
ogy? It may survive here and there, but it is hardly mainstream philosophy. 
And yet, while few may explicitly endorse Descartes’ immaterialist ontology, 
many implicitly assume that human intellect has the universal range with 
regard to the natural world that Descartes ascribed to it. It is not hard to fi nd 
an attitude in contemporary philosophy that takes for granted that there are, 
in principle, no obstacles to our knowing and understanding all aspects of 
nature. Indeed, it is not uncommon to come across references to a “theory 
of everything”, and to fi nd philosophers and scientists who are optimistic 
about such a  theory being achieved.16 Chomsky thinks this is a  sign that
many have not learnt the primitive lesson of evolutionary biology: “[...] the 
theory of evolution places humans fi rmly within the natural world, taking 
humans to be biological organisms, much like others, hence with capacities 
that have scope and limits including the cognitive domain.”17
14 DESCARTES, Th e Discourse on the Method (1637). Chomsky cites the older English 
translation, Th e Philosophical Works of Descartes. Translated by HALDANE, E. S. –ROSS, 
G. R. T. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1931, vol. 1, quoting p. 116. In the more 
recent translation, Th e Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by COTTINGHAM,
J. – STOOTHOFF, R. – MURDOCH, D. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press 1985, p. 140, it is 
rendered as “a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of situations”.
15  “It is necessary [...] since the intellect thinks all things, that the intellect be unmixed.” 
ARISTOTLE, De anima. London: Penguin 1986, III. 4., (429a).
16  For a trenchant statement of this view, see Alex ROSENBERG,Th e Atheist’s Guide to Reality. 
London – New York: Norton 2011. He writes that “science’s understanding of the world is 
correct in its fundamentals [and] when ‘complete’, what science tells us will not be surprisingly 
diff erent from what science tells us today” (ibid, chapter 1). Th is suggests that there are no 
limits to our ability to arrive at a complete understanding of the fundamentals of nature, 
despite our minds having arisen from a blind evolutionary process that cannot guarantee that 
our belief-forming processes really track the truth.
17  Noam CHOMSKY, “What Kind of Creatures are We? Dewey Lectures 2013.” Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 110, 2013, no. 12, p. 683, emphasis JH. Th is thought is, for Chomsky, an obvious 
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Just as our bodily organs, as adaptations, allow us to digest, respire, sense 
(etc) certain objects and not others, so our cognitive abilities are primed 
to cope with certain tasks, and are not adapted for others. Th is inevitably 
means that there will some conceptions and hypotheses that are quite be-
yond the ability of our faculties to entertain or frame.
In rejecting the universal instrument view, Chomsky also defends 
a more specifi c thesis about the nature of mind. Th e mind, he argues, is con-
stituted by a set of cognitive “organs”. Th e word “organ” here is not intended 
in the full literal sense. Chomsky is not committed to mental faculties being 
embodied in neatly-demarcated units in the brain, just as the liver and the 
heart are separable parts of our bodies below the neck. Whatever the exact 
nature of their structural instantiation, however, Chomsky does hold that 
individual mental faculties have a semi-autonomous ability to function that 
is captured by the technical term “module”. In Chomsky’s view the diff erent 
modules of the mind develop and grow in relative independence from one 
another, and their operations are, to a signifi cant extent, disociable from one 
another and from the central systems that monitor or collate their activity. 
Th is is especially clear in the case of the linguistic faculty which may remain 
functional in patients who otherwise suff er from severe mental impairments.
A modular approach to the mind has, of course, been spelt out and 
defended in detail by others, particularly by Jerry Fodor. It would be wrong, 
however, to treat the views of Chomsky and Fodor as identical. Chomsky is 
less ready than Fodor to reduce the modules of the mind to encapsulated 
computational systems. Also, and more importantly, Chomsky fi nds Fodor’s
modularity too restricted, as it concerns only the peripheral input and out-
put mechanisms involved in perception and motor response. Chomsky goes 
much further than Fodor when, for example, he talks of a module equipped 
to originate scientifi c hypotheses (“the science-forming faculty”), and 
a module for moral judgement.18
and banal one, which he describes as “a truism that is sometimes thoughtlessly derided as 
‘mysterianism’.” Noam CHOMSKY, “Opening Remarks.” In: PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, M. 
– URIAGEREKA, J. – SALABURU, P. (eds.), Of Minds and Language: A Dialogue with Noam 
Chomsky in the Basque Country. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 18 (13–43).
18  Chomsky is quoted as saying: “Th ere’s some instinctive mechanism we have that is a kind 
of theory construction module of the brain [...] that maps – that constructs – theoretical 
interpretation from scattered data. And we do it instinctively. And then we check it out by 
induction and methodology of science and all that kind of stuff .” Michael HALEY – Ronald 
LUNSFORD, Noam Chomsky. New York: Twayne 1994, p. 182. See also Noam CHOMSKY, 
“Reply to Lycan.” In: ANTONY, L. M. – HORNSTEIN, N. (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. 
Oxford: Blackwell 2003, p. 256.
James Hill
445
Fodor and Chomsky agree, however, in drawing a similar epistemologi-
cal conclusion from modularity which Fodor has termed “epistemic bound-
edness”. Th e selective focus of the diff erent modules of the mind means that 
while certain kinds of natural properties are highly amenable to human 
comprehension, other aspects of reality must inevitably transcend our 
cognitive capacities, “just as rats cannot deal with a prime number maze”.19
Highly penetrative faculties that can pick out aspects of the environment, 
or excogitate precise models or hypotheses, bring with them limits of scope 
and blind spots. Th ere will inevitably be some concepts or hypotheses that 
are not available to us. As in a baroque painting, centres of intense illumina-
tion are produced by deep shadow in the surrounds. Fodor writes:
If each “mental organ” is pretuned to the solution of computational problems 
with a specifi c sort of structure, then it is surely in the cards that there should 
be some problems whose structure the mind has no computational resources 
for coping with [...] it is entirely compatible with a modularity theory that there 
should be endogenously determined constraints on our mental capacities such 
that the best science – the true theory of the structure of the world – is not one 
of the theories we are capable of entertaining.20
Chomsky, like Fodor, holds that the intelligence of a mental organ or module 
is the result of a preformed internal structure, without which there would be 
no useful focus. He makes the following biological comparison: “If a zygote 
had no further genetic instructions constraining its developmental path, it 
would at best grow into a creature formed solely by physical law, like a snow-
fl ake, nothing viable.”21 And more recently he has written:
[I]f the genetic endowment imposed no constraints on growth and development 
of an organism it could become only a shapeless amoeboid creature, refl ecting 
accidents of an unanalyzed environment. Th e conditions that prevent a human 
embryo from becoming an insect play a critical role in determining that it can 
become a human, and the same holds in the cognitive domain.22
If preformed internal structure is responsible for the viability of the cognitive 
powers of a module, then it also limits that viability. Th e internal structure 
may enable a module to have selective focus, but to select is also to limit and 
19 CHOMSKY, “Mysteries of Nature,” p. 185.
20  Jerry FODOR,Th e Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1983.
21  CHOMSKY, “Mysteries of Nature,” p. 185 (167–200).
22  CHOMSKY, “What Kind of Creatures are We?” p. 684, emphasis JH
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exclude what comes into one’s purview. So, for example, if a child’s language 
module is equipped to anticipate the hierarchical syntactical structure of 
a human language, then it will probably be quite unprepared for a non-
human “Martian” language, with whatever special forms of grammar that 
might have.
Now, epistemic boundedness is hardly a new idea in philosophy. John 
Locke and Immanuel Kant are two thinkers who present philosophical out-
looks that stress our cognitive limits. But both Locke and Kant, in their dif-
ferent ways, thought that these limits can be traced by philosophical refl ec-
tion, and that the non-plus-ultra boundaries of human enquiry can therefore 
be fairly clearly and defi nitively stated. For Locke, it is his empiricism with 
its two “fountains” of simple ideas, which limits what we can think about 
and understand. For Kant it is the forms of sensible intuition, as well as the 
specifi c categories of the understanding, that determine how we conceive 
and experience the world, and which limit our grasp of how things are “in 
themselves”. Chomsky has no doubt been infl uenced by adaptations of the 
Kantian tradition, not least as expressed in the ethology of Nikolaas Tinber-
gen and Konrad Lorenz.23 But his position is also signifi cantly diff erent from 
an even loosely-Kantian one on this issue. Th is is because Chomsky thinks 
that we can never delineate the bounds of our cognition with anything ap-
proaching certainty. Although the ongoing investigations of science intimate 
to us, with a greater or lesser degree of probability, where our limits may lie, 
no conclusive claims should be made. It will never be infallibly certain what 
is a “puzzle” (a problem that is in principle solvable by our cognitive powers), 
and a “mystery” (a problem that is not humanly solvable).
Th e reasons for this indeterminacy are clear. We know so little about 
how the brain works that it would be foolish to make any systematic attempt 
to plot the limits of its powers. And the reason we know so little about the 
brain presumably is on account of the modules of the brain not having been 
developed for investigating the brain itself. Th us Chomsky’s position ends 
up being more open and tentative when refl ecting on our limits than, say, 
the position that has described by Colin McGinn’s with the term “cognitive 
closure”. Th ough it has clearly been inspired by Chomsky, McGinn’s view 
23  Lorenz writes, for example, that “the ‘a priori’ apparatus of possible experience with all 
its forms of intuitions and categories is not something immutably determined by factors 
extraneous to nature but rather something that mirrors the natural laws in contact with which 
it has evolved in the closest reciprocal interaction ...” Konrad LORENZ, “Kant’s Doctrine 
of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology.” In: RUSE, M. (ed.), Philosophy aft er 
Darwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2009, p. 232 (231–247).
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is actually much closer to Locke and Kant because he is willing to off er us 
a priori reasons for excluding the possibility that we might come to a scien-
tifi c solution of the mind-body problem.24
4. Th e Internal coherence of Chomsky’s ppposition to physicalism
We have described two themes in Chomsky’s thought that underwrite his 
sceptical attitude to physicalism. Th e fi rst is an understanding of the New-
tonian revolution which introduced an open, evolving scientifi c ontology, 
unconstrained by any fi xed conception of the physical. Th e second is the 
modular theory of the mind, which brings with it epistemic boundedness, 
and faculties that are capable of grasping only certain aspects of the natural 
environment. Th ese two themes seem to have been developed separately in 
Chomsky’s thinking, but they also turn out to be mutually supportive and 
together they make his opposition to physicalism much more than a defi ni-
tional quibble. We are dealing with a refl ected and coherent critique of the 
doctrine.
Its coherence is reinforced by internal lines of support that connect 
the separate theses. A fi rst line of support goes from Chomsky’s modular 
theory of the mind to his historical understanding of science. On the modu-
lar view, it is only to be expected that there is an intuitive concept of the 
physical which shapes both the common-sense view of the world and early 
scientifi c hypotheses. Th is is presumably the result of a biological module 
for understanding physical objects in our environment. Chomsky thinks 
that this module predisposes us to the concept of matter in early-modern 
mechanistic science – a space-fi lling stuff  that acts by motion and contact. 
Th e attempts to cling to this view by Newton’s mechanist opponents, as well 
as the later attempts to fi nd a quasi-mechanical underpinning for physics in 
the invisible ether, all show the power of this innate cognitive disposition.
In addition, the fact that natural sciences have not always made progress 
by giving us more transparent descriptions of the workings of nature, but 
also by abandoning attempts to elucidate certain key phenomena, is pre-
cisely what we should expect on Chomsky’s modular view of the mind. Aft er 
all, human science is an investigation carried out by our modular brains, 
24  Colin McGINN, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” In:Th e Problem of Consciousness. 
Oxford: Blackwell 1991, pp. 1–22. Here, for example, McGinn is able to invoke Kant’s view 
about spatiality being the form of outer sensibility to help exclude the possibility of any 
humanly-accessible solution to the mind-body problem (see p. 12).
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with their inevitable blind-spots and cognitive limitations. Th e history of 
scientifi c progress, with its uneven focus, and its increasingly patchy intel-
ligibility, thus acts as confi rmation of the Chomskian modular theory of the 
mind. Chomsky’s favoured examples of problems which were never solved, 
but rather dropped in a tacit admission of their intractability, are free-will, 
and the very phenomenon of motion.25 We lack a module, he thinks, that 
might begin to explicate these phenomena.
Support is also to be found in the opposite direction: Chomsky’s under-
standing of the progress of science backs up his modular theory of mind. 
Th e most important evidence for the modular view, as we have said, comes 
from Chomsky’s work on language. He has consistently maintained that our 
acquisition of language cannot be explained by general mental competences 
or dispositions, such as association or inductive reasoning. Such general 
competences would never suffi  ce for the child because of the poverty of the 
linguistic stimulus available to it during its period of learning. So an innate 
organ for language must be postulated. Th is language module has not yet 
been successfully located in the brain, nor has its evolutionary emergence 
been adequately accounted for, but it is a  necessary posit, according to 
Chomsky, given the manifest principles of linguistic competence and what 
we know from our analytical study of grammar. To reject the module of 
language because it has not yet been incorporated into neurophysiology or 
evolutionary theory is to risk playing Leibniz to Newton. Chomsky implies 
that critics who take this line are like the conservative Hanoverian who 
grumbled about Newton’s force of gravitation being an “occult” or miracu-
lous power because he could not make it fi t into his mechanistic physics.
I don’t mean to imply that Chomsky denies that the language module 
will ever be explicable in terms of neurophysiology and evolutionary theory. 
He would almost certainly allow that possibility, particularly if those two 
parts of science were to undergo currently-unforeseen developmental shift s. 
But the important point for Chomsky is that the manifest principles are 
evidence enough for the language module, and that cognitive science should 
not be harassed or bullied by theorists from other disciplines who demand 
a  too hasty reduction. Aft er all, the fi rst task must be to give an adequate 
description of the faculty that is to be the target for reduction.
25  See, for example Noam CHOMSKY, “Reply to Lycan,” p. 262 (255-263); and Noam 
CHOMSKY, “Reply to Poland.” In: ANTONY, L. M. – HORNSTEIN, N. (eds.), Chomsky and 
His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell 2003, p. 267 (263–265).
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It is part of the post-Newtonian heritage, Chomsky thinks, that we lack 
a clear and certain conception of the essence of matter on which all the dif-
ferent parts of science can rest, and which they must conform to. Special 
sciences are now free to develop in relative autonomy. Th eir incorporation 
into other sciences, particularly core sciences, may take a variety of forms, 
one being the expansion, or transformation of the core sciences themselves. 
Chomsky treats the example of chemistry as informative. Aft er the mechani-
cal philosophy was abandoned in the wake of Newton, chemistry was able 
to develop as an independent discipline because no reduction of chemical 
elements to a circumscribed domain of physics was demanded. Chemistry 
was made properly consistent with physics more than two centuries later 
aft er the quantum-theoretic revolution so transformed physics that it could 
become “unifi ed with a virtually unchanged chemistry”.26 So we might say 
that in this case it was the “lower” part of the edifi ce of natural science that 
re-invented itself so that accommodation to the “higher” part was made 
possible. Or – since the lower part is oft en associated with the very meaning 
of the term “material” – we might say that chemistry became reducible (in 
principle) to physics only because our conception of the material evolved.
5. Th e distinctive power of Chomsky’s opposition to physicalism
We are now in a position to say something more precise about Chomsky’s re-
jection of physicalism and how it diff ers from other closely-related critiques 
of the doctrine. Let us compare Chomsky’s critique with what is known as 
“Hempel’s dilemma”.
Carl Hempel, like Chomsky, held that physicalism is a vacuous doctrine. 
He argued his case by way of a dilemma which might be put like this:
Either the physicalist will defi ne “the physical” by (i) the contents of contem-
porary physics, or (ii) by the contents of ideal physics. If physicalism is defi ned 
with reference to contemporary physics, it is clearly false, as no one thinks 
that physicists now know the whole truth about the world. But if physicalism 
is defi ned with reference to ideal physics then it is an indeterminate doctrine 
because it is unclear what would be ruled in and what would be ruled out.27
26 CHOMSKY, “What Kind of Creatures are We?” p. 669.
27  See STOLJAR, Physicalism, chapter 5 for an in-depth interpretation of Hempel’s Dilemma
along these lines.
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Let us take this dilemma as a starting point for expressing Chomsky’s rejec-
tion of physicalism. Chomsky’s emphasis on the open and evolving nature 
of the core sciences since the Newtonian revolution sharpens the dilemma. 
Contemporary physics becomes open to possible expansion in the future 
and a complete physics is more obviously indeterminate from the standpoint 
of the present.
But that is only a starting point, for Chomsky would also be keenly aware 
of an unclarity in the expression “ideal physics” in (ii), the second horn of 
the dilemma. It is not specifi ed whether we are being asked to consider an 
“ideal human physics” or an ideal physics per se. Th ese two concepts were 
not perhaps distinguishable for Hempel with his positivist background. But 
for Chomsky who, as we have seen, emphasises our cognitive boundedness, 
they cannot be treated as coinciding as a matter of course. If an ideal physics 
per se is meant, then we have no reason to think that it is within the cogni-
tive reach of the biologically-fi xed modules that constitute our minds. By 
the same token, if an ideal human physics is meant we have no reason to 
assume it will be complete. Indeed, on the contrary, we should expect such 
physics, given our nature and origin, to be partial and constrained by our 
contingent biological make-up. Th is is the message of Chomsky’s remarks 
about evolution, as we have already quoted him above as saying: “[...] the 
theory of evolution places humans fi rmly within the natural world, taking 
humans to be biological organisms, much like others, hence with capacities 
that have scope and limits including the cognitive domain.”28
Th e overall result is that the gap between the two horns of Hempel’s di-
lemma is indefi nitely widened. Th is undercuts a possible physicalist response 
to the dilemma that would say that the current state of physics is suffi  ciently 
close to completion to guide us in judging which entities and processes will 
fi gure in an ideal physics. Th e central claim of physicalism, that the mind is 
itself constituted by the physical, thus becomes quite vacuous. We have no 
way of determining whether a complete physics would include an expansion 
of the physical to include the mental in a non-reductive way. We therefore 
have no argument at our disposal to foreclose speculation about possible 
paradigm-shift s in our understanding of the physical, as presented by, say, 
panpsychism, the quantum theory of consciousness or Russellian monism. 
It is simply dogmatism on the part of physicalism to assume a rigidly non-
mentalistic conception of the physical.
28  CHOMSKY, “What Kind of Creatures are We?” p. 683.
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6. Th e mind and consciousness
In the fi nal two parts of this paper I would like to say something more about 
the relation of the mental to natural science in Chomsky’s work, and about 
the broader question of his understanding of the mental. We have already 
said that he approaches the mind within a naturalistic, biological frame-
work. But we must add a  further important methodological assumption 
which needs to be made fully explict.
In Chomsky’s 1959 review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, the classic 
critique of the behaviourist account of linguistic competence, sometimes 
seen as marking the beginning of “cognitive science”, he voiced two funda-
mental and abiding features of his approach to the mental. Th e fi rst is widely 
celebrated. Chomsky rejected Skinner’s minimalist approach to cognitive 
architecture. For Skinner, the child’s mind was essentially unstructured 
– a black box that was thought to react to external stimuli in accord only 
with certain primitive and universal psychological laws such as aversion 
and reinforcement. Th is behaviourist approach, Chomsky wrote, makes the 
fundamental mistake of “refus[ing] to study the contribution of the child to 
language learning”.29 Chomsky’s alternative was, and is, to attribute to the 
mind a  rich internal structure that processes information and has innate 
cognition of universal grammar and other information at its disposal.
Th e second feature of Chomsky’s position is less oft en remarked upon. 
It is a crucial point of agreement with Skinner. Chomsky endorses Skinner’s
understanding of the data that is to be explained by any science dealing with 
the “higher mental processes”, of which language competence is a part.30
Skinner is perfectly right, Chomsky argues early in the review, to take out-
ward behaviour as the raw material for a science of mind.
nsofar as independent neurophysiological evidence is not available, it is obvious 
that inferences concerning the structure of the organism are based on observa-
tion of behaviour and outside events.31
29  Noam CHOMSKY. “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior.” Language, vol. 35, 1959, 
no. 1, p. 58 (26–58).
30  Commenting on a reprint of the review, Chomsky refl ects that his reaction to Skinner’s 
work was intended “as a more general critique of behaviorist [...] speculation as to the nature 
of higher mental processes.” Noam CHOMSKY “Preface to A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal 
Behavior.” In: JAKOBOVITS, L. A. – MIRON, M. S. (eds.), Readings in the Psychology of 
Language. Englewood Cliff s, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1967, p. 142 (142–143).
31  CHOMSKY. “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior,” p. 27.
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Here, Chomsky implies that there are two legitimate kinds of data that 
are the foundation for a science of the mind: data about the brain and its 
activities (neurophysiological evidence), and observation of the behaviour 
of the phenotype. Given the paucity of neurophysiological data in the 1950s, 
when the review was written, Chomsky felt able to endorse Skinner’s con-
centration on behavioural data. In Language and Mind, Chomsky reminds 
us that:
No sane person has ever doubted that behavior provides much of the evidence 
for this study [science of the mind] – all of the evidence, if we interpret “behav-
ior” in a suffi  ciently loose sense.32
Th is emphasis on behaviour in the study of mind is also evident in Chomsky’s 
idiosyncratic yet highly stimulating reading of René Descartes, a version of 
which has recently been defended in detail by Desmond Clarke.33 Most read-
ers of Descartes on mind concentrate on the importance of our awareness 
of inner mental states as expressed in the Meditations. Not Chomsky. He 
focuses on the Discourse where Descartes argues that it is the creativity of 
linguistic behaviour that is crucial in distinguishing human minds from 
animals and machines. Chomsky argues that Descartes was recognising his 
own inability to explain this creativity using res extensa and it was this that
led him to posit the immaterial substance of res cogitans. Descartes, on this
interpretation, approaches the mind with the eyes of a natural scientist com-
ing upon a complex phenomenon in the environment, not as an introspec-
tive meditator who peers into himself.
Oddly enough, it seems to be precisely this third person view of the 
mental, so oft en associated with physicalist orientations, which fi gures in 
Chomsky’s rejection of physicalism. Chomsky thinks that we should not
treat mental phenomena as somehow special in comparison with other parts 
of nature:
I understand “mental” to be on a par with “chemical”, “optical”, or “electrical”. 
[...] We do not seek to determine the true criterion of the chemical, or the mark
of the electrical, or the boundaries of the optical.34
32  Noam CHOMSKY. Language and Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2006, p. 57. Th e 
“loose sense” of behaviour presumably allows for neurophysical activities that are becoming
increasingly easy to monitor.
33  Desmond M. CLARKE, Descartes’s Th eory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, 
see esp. chapter 6.
34  CHOMSKY, “Language and Nature,” p. 1.
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More recently, Chomsky underlines this view, opining that we should not 
seek any special methodology when studying the mind. In particular we 
should resist
a curious tendency to treat mental aspects of the human organism diff erently 
from so-called “physical” aspects, a kind of methodological dualism, which is 
more pernicious than Cartesian metaphysical dualism.35
So, for Chomsky, the mental is a natural phenomenon, like the chemical, the 
optical or the electrical, which presents certain third personal data to the 
scientist which must be explained, with the ultimate hope that the explana-
tions can be unifi ed with other parts of scientifi c theory, particularly the 
core sciences. Chomsky thinks there is nothing methodologically peculiar 
about mental phenomena from the scientifi c view. He holds that examina-
tion of mental phenomena is examination of the body, as it behaves, and, 
more recently he has put emphasis on research into the brain. “I use the 
term ‘mind’”, he tells us, as referring to “study of the body – pecifi cally the 
brain –conducted at a certain level of abstraction”.36
Now this assumption not only determines method, it also determines 
the nature of the phenomena that can be treated by the method. Th e third 
personal point of view inevitably excludes the felt quality of experience. 
Aft er all, felt qualities, like, say, the taste of lemon or the characteristic feel-
ings anxiety or nostalgia, are known directly only from the fi rst-personal 
point of view, when the mind is turned inwards, to the content of its own 
experience. With the recent interest in the problem of consciousness, the 
importance of felt qualities – sometimes called qualia – has met with wider 
recognition. Th ere are some signs that Chomsky is responsive to this inter-
est in consciousness which makes his previous attachment to third-personal 
data problematic.37
35  CHOMSKY, “What Kind of Creatures are We?” p. 665.
36 CHOMSKY, “Reply to Lycan,” p. 257.
37  Chomsky’s interest in the problem of consciousness is visible in the aforementioned exchange 
with Galen Strawson in Chomsky and his Critics, and in his recent Dewey Lectures where 
he takes very seriously Th omas Nagel’s objections to materialist neo-Darwinism, which are 
founded – most prominently if not exclusively – on the problem of consciousness. Chomsky’s 
positive assessment of Nagel’s thesis is worth quoting at length because of its intrinsic interest: 
“Th omas Nagel, in recent work that has been highly controversial, writes that ‘Mind, I suspect, 
is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift  but a basic aspect of nature 
that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientifi c 
orthodoxy.’ If that turns out to be true, it would not be much of a departure from the history 
of science.” Noam CHOMSKY, “What Kind of Creatures are We?” p. 670.
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Recognition of phenomenal consciousness brings with it recognition 
that the mental, as a natural phenomenon, does have a notable peculiarity 
that other natural phenomena lack. Unlike the chemical, optical, electrical 
phenomena that Chomsky lists, the mental is known, at least some of the 
time, from the fi rst-person point of view. If one limits oneself to the third-
personal point of view one will either tend to treat felt-qualities as lying 
outside the domain of science or one will have to smuggle such qualities 
into what has been called the “heterophenomological” approach, by inad-
vertently taking for granted the empathy of the experimenter, or one’s own 
empathy as reader of the experimental work.38
7. A proposal
While this is not the place to provide detailed argument for a particular view 
of the mind, I would like to conclude with a suggestion. It is this: Chomsky’s 
case against physicalism may be adapted to the framework of a dual-aspect 
theory. Th is would involve departing from the assumption about the data of 
science that we have just mentioned. We would assert, pace Chomsky, that 
the mental is peculiar in having two aspects. While chemical, optical and 
electrical phenomena do not have an “inner aspect” (as far as we know), the 
mental does. It is knowable not only from an external, third-person point of 
view, but also from an internal, fi rst person point of view – there is “some-
thing it is like to be” (to use Th omas Nagel’s phrase) in a mental state. Once 
we have recognised the two aspects of the mental, we can then fully endorse 
Chomsky’s scepticism about “the physical” and his open-minded attitude 
towards the possibility that the mental may be downwardly incorporated 
into some modifi cation or transformation of the core sciences.
Dual aspect theory is not metaphysical dualism: it does not assert the 
existence of two quite disparate, and ontologically independent, substances. 
Rather, it acknowledges that, at our current level of knowledge, the mental 
has an internal and an external face. Th is fact is among the fundamental 
data that a naturalistic theory of mind should explain. Once that is acknowl-
edged, dual aspect theory may then join Chomsky in remaining agnostic on 
two further points: (i) whether humans will ever be able to gain an insight 
38 For the proposal of the heterophenomenological method (phenomenology of hetero—the
other) see Daniel DENNETT, Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin 1991, pp. 66–98. 
Dennett states that a theory of consciousness “will have to be constructed from the third-
person point of view, since all science is constructed from that perspective,” (ibid, p. 71) and it
seems that Chomsky would have little reason to dissent. 
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into how mental phenomena might be unifi ed with the core sciences; and 
(ii) whether that unifi cation would inevitably mean reduction of the mental 
to existing physical theories, and not rather an expansion of the physical 
theories to somehow encompass mental phenomena. Th us a Chomskian 
dual-aspect theorist would not cut mind off  from the rest of nature, nor 
would he or she ignore the peculiar diffi  culties of incorporating mental 
phenomena into a wider naturalistic system. Instead a mitigated scepticism, 
of the kind that Chomsky associates with our Newtonian heritage, may be 
consciously embraced, allowing us space to develop a proper appreciation of 
mental phenomena without rushing into a premature reduction of mind to 
that most mysterious entity, “matter”.
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